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Zoning is one of the major tools of land use regulation and it could be the core issue 
especially in some small-sized municipalities. Zoning not only expresses the rationality 
of individual planners but also conveys the will and interest of the involved 
stakeholders, usually including the residents, government, property owners, 
developers, etc. Therefore, the entire process of zoning, from framing and formulating 
to implementation and amendment, is filled up with negotiation and compromise 
between these groups.  
 
Zoning need to keep appropriately flexible in order to deal with the particular 
circumstances, also to accommodate themselves in the changing situation and settings. 
Accordingly, planners get the power of discretion to interpret the related law, zoning 
code, ordinance and maps. Meanwhile, it inevitably makes itself open for criticism as 
arbitration and unfairness, which brings the debate about “consistency” of zoning. In 
fact, the consistency is a major foundation of the legitimacy of zoning, judged by the 
Equal Protection Clause, which requires the public power to regard individual citizens 
with on difference. 
 
However, the more detailed a zoning is, especially mapped detailed, the greater the 
contradiction will be between the flexibility and consistency. And the easiest solution 
is to institute an amendment process (Rider, 1980) but the solution itself might create 
even more problems. There is always serious misgiving about spot zoning or contract 
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zoning, which will lead to rent-seeking behavior and is taken as illegal delegation of 
public power. Therefore, the amendment process should be elaborately designed and 
highly transparent, public-involved and rigid. Besides the political factors, there are 
also economic considerations. In order to keep the "predictability" and "fairness" of 
land use decisions, which is the pivot of the fluency of the related market, like real-
estate market, the amendment process is usually made difficult to run through. 
Nevertheless, the frequency of this kind of amendments could be viewed as an 
indicator of the flexibility and consistency of zoning. Thus, this research will focus on 
the zoning amendments, aiming to cast some lights on the determinant factors of the 
implement of the process.  
 
Literature Review 
1. Rationality of Zoning 
There are long-lasting debates about influence of the land use regulations in 
metropolitan, urban and suburban areas. There are two opposing paradigms of zoning, 
in terms of looking at the government behavior: the Pigovian paradigm (based on 
Pigou’s book the Economics of Welfare) and the Coasian paradigm (derived from 
Coase’s Nobel Prize paper “The Problem of Social Cost”). The Pigovian paradigm 
focuses on the notion of “external effects”, or “neighborhood effects” or “externalities”. 
The concept of “external effects” refers to such phenomena that the cost (negative 
externality) or benefit (positive externality) that affects a party who did not choose to 
incur that cost or benefit. In terms of land use issues, it mainly deals with the problem 
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of “pollution” or “nuisance”, in which case, the cost generated by one party is 
burdened by the others or the whole society. As the market only responds to private 
costs and benefits, it would fail to equate marginal value and marginal social costs, 
which is required as a condition for Pareto economic efficiency. Therefore, the 
government should take measures, such as zoning, to regulate land use in order to 
rectify the distorted market, maximizing the total social welfare. However, the Coasian 
paradigm believes that as long as the property rights are clearly defined, the 
“externality” will be internalized so that the market itself will fix the problem of “social 
cost”. Furthermore, it criticizes the Pigovians of ignoring the transaction cost might be 
generated during the policy formulating and implementing process. That is to say, the 
Pigovians treat policies as if they are “exogenous” or “autonomous” with zero cost. 
However, this assumption is obviously unrealistic, as a result, the government 
intervention itself will cause a considerable social cost, inducing a social economic 
inefficiency. In general, the two paradigm lay the cornerstone for the pros and cons of 
zoning in political economic theories. (Chung, 1994) 
 
2. Different Dimensions of Zoning 
Beyond the debate about the rationality and justification of zoning, there are also 
discussions on the different dimensions of government intervention. On the one hand, 
land use planning, such as zoning, play a role as active intervention or “ordinary 
forethought” (Branch, 1990). The spectrum of this faction spreads from viewing 
planning as totally an intentional action (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1986), to 
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coordinating planning with hierarchical organization. On the other hand, zoning, 
together with other land use planning, works as a passive response to the paucity of 
guide and control caused by the spontaneous growth of a city. (Alexander,1992) 
 
Similarly, Rolleston’s (1987) offers a dichotomy of zoning: the externality zoning and 
fiscal zoning or exclusionary zoning. As mentioned above, the rational purpose of 
Pigou-style externality zoning is to promote the “general welfare” by segregating 
incompatible land uses to correct the market failure created by negative externalities, 
which helps to form an efficient land development pattern. The other side of zoning is 
defined as “fiscal zoning” or “exclusionary zoning”. The notion reveals that land use is 
also regulated to accomplish local fiscal objectives. Concern over the composition and 
size of the local tax base and over the level of public services demanded by land users, 
it is argued, encourages communities to view local development patterns in terms of 
their fiscal implications. Furthermore, zoning may serve as a piece of policy instrument 
through which neighboring communities engage in fiscal competition in the battle for 
high revenue-generating land uses and low expenditure-demanding land users.  
 
3. Social and Economic Factors Correlated with Zoning 
To justify the economic efficiency or in-efficiency and the social fairness or unfairness 
of zoning, the scholars do huge amount of researches attempting to cast light on the 
impact of zoning and rezoning, involving zoning and rezoning’s influence on land price, 
property value, community character, population migration, etc. Especially, there are 
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a large number researches focusing on the zoning or rezoning’s impact on land value 
and property price. (Jud, 1980; Lin and Hwang, 2004; Maser et al., 1977; Ohls et al., 
1974; Quigley and Rosenthal, 2005) Chressanthis (1986) conducts a time-series study 
looking at the pre-event and post-event housing prices after a zoning change in the 
Lafayette-West Lafayette urban area from 1960 to 1980, whose empirical results tend 
to confirm that major zoning changes significantly affect housing prices. Hedonic 
housing price model are the most widely used method to analyze the effect of zoning 
regulations. (Pogodzinski & Sass, 1990) However, diverse results in different time and 
geographical backgrounds come out from similar methodologies. Wolf-Powers (2005) 
examines land use policy and real estate market activity in the 1990s in two mixed-use 
neighborhoods in New York City. Based on the data collected from case studies of 
Greenpoint-Williamsburg in Brooklyn and Long Island City in Queens, the research 
finds that opportunistic development and industrial displacement taking places there 
is partly due to the adhering to the ossified principle of highest and best use, together 
with an incremental approach to planning and land use regulation. While Beitel (2007) 
using time-series models of construction and price levels in the San Francisco housing 
market rejects the assumption that more strict zoning regulations lead to less housing 
construction and more housing speculation, which inflating the price.  
 
There are also quite a few researches about the impact of zoning and other land use 
regulations on the demographic characters of a community or a city. 23. Quigley, 
Raphael, and Rosenthal (2004) analyses the relationship between the land-use policies 
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adopted by local governments in California and the large-scaled redistribution of its 
population during the decade of the 1990s, discovering that local land-use policy 
significantly affects the race or ethnicity the path and composition of population 
growth at the city level. Talen (2005) addresses the question of whether, and how, 
zoning and population diversity affect each other. To give an answer to the questions, 
she assesses the patterns of zoning by parcel and uses the Simpson Diversity index to 
measure with the patterns of socioeconomic diversity in the twin cities of Champaign 
and Urbana by census block group. The findings shows that there is an association 
between the diversity of residential zoning and income.  
 
Furman Center (2010) conducted a research about the influence of rezoning in recent 
years on the housing capacity of New York City. It calculates the “paper” lot capacity 
by the lot FAR (floor area ratio) and the buildable residential area within a lot and 
grouped the lots into three categories: up-zoned, down-zoned and contextual-only 
rezoned by comparing the “paper” lot capacity before and after the rezoning. Then the 
research analyze the different types of community, finding that the adjacency to rail 
stations, low median income level will give rise to probability of up-zoning. 
 
Compared to the abundant studies about the influence of zoning, the number of 
researches focusing on the impact factors on zoning is relatively limited. Just like a 
reverse of the studies mentioned above, Munneke (2005) empirically examines the 
role of land prices in the decision to change the zoning of a parcel, claiming that 
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principle behind rezoning is simple; as the value or price of a parcel in an alternative 
land use classification rises relative to the value or price in its current classification, 
the probability of the parcel being allocated away from the current land use 
classification should increase. Thus, a parcel would be reallocated to a different land 
use if its value in the alternative use, less conversion costs, is greater than its value 
under its current land use classification. In McMillen & McDonald’s research in 1990, 
simultaneous equations models on four different categories of land use with selectivity 
are estimated by maximum likelihood method. They assumes that zoning is a function 
of lagged land use and corresponding land values, and furthermore, values are a 
function of the characteristics of the parcel. They construct land value estimation for 
all uses and parcels, and then apply the estimation as explanatory variables in two-
limit Tobit models of zoning. The result shows that only single-family residential zoning 
responds to incremental changes in the corresponded land values. In their another 
research conducted in Chicago, McMillen & McDonald (1990) apply a Markov Chain 
model of land use zoning estimated based on the data from suburban Chicago from  
1961 to 1981. And they find that conversion from residential to non-residential use 
tend to happen when it is located in periphery suburban areas and at the time of 
incorporation (or shortly thereafter). Furthermore, they also discover an equilibrium 
pattern of land use in this suburban area of Chicago. It is that the suburbs follow a 
pattern centered by a ring of non-residential land, then expanding to a ring of single-




When it comes to population issue, Hinds & Ordway (1986) examine the rejection rates 
for rezoning applications over time in predominantly white and predominantly black 
census tracts in Atlanta, Georgia. They identify inequality of treatment as between 
heavily white and heavily black tracts during a period of no black representation 
among elected city officials and equality of treatment during a later period when 
blacks were substantially represented in government. 
 
4. Summary of Literature 
Despite of the opposition between Pigovian paradigm and Coasian paradigm in the 
justification of zoning, we could reach an agreement that each zoning and zoning 
amendment is a re-arrangement of property rights, resulting in a transfer of welfare, 
leaving behind the debate on whether the aggregated social welfare will be increased 
or not. It is evitable that through this transfer, some people will be better off while 
others worse off, which naturally generates an expectation of conflicts between the 
winners and losers. This expectation could make even the potential winner of the 
transfer to think twice before deciding whether to propose it or not. What increases 
the complexity of the expectation is that, zoning is not only a passive respond by the 
government in order to correct the market failure created by externalities but also a 
policy tool of positive intervention to fulfill its own goal. In another words, the 
government does not purely play a role as a representative of public welfare but also 
pursue its own interests at the same time. As a verification, according to the reviewed 
literatures, though zoning is a government behavior with far-reaching impacts, it is also 
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influenced by a series of social and economic factors. In brief, it is both a cause and an 
effect simultaneously. It is not enough to merely focus on the influence of zoning, as 
done by the former research.  
 
Thus, the purpose of this research is to build up a logic how the zoning and zoning 
amendment cooperate with the different social and economic factors. A series of 
factors, which have been believed to be related to zoning amendment supported by 
the literatures, such as property value, population composition and other community 
characters will be examined, which in return, will give a knowledge about and a deeper 




Figure 1: Theoretical Framework of the Analysis of Frequency of Zoning Amendments 
The core notion of this study is the frequency of zoning amendments. And the chart 
above illustrates why the frequency of zoning amendments is viewed as a pivot 
conception, through which, a series of planning topics could be explored and 
understood.  
 
First of all, the frequency of zoning amendments could be regarded as a direct indicator 
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for the contradictive consistency and flexibility of a zoning system. The frequency of 
zoning amendments means within a certain period of time (for example, one decade), 
the number of zoning amendments happened in the same area defined by a certain 
geographic scope. And the zoning amendments could be divided into two groups: the 
public initiated ones and the private initiated ones. The public initiated ones refer to 
zoning amendments proposed by the branches of local, state or central government 
and the others are counted as private initiated ones, which is usually proposed by 
individual property owners (person, enterprise or other institution) or private 
developers. Just following the dichotomy of nature land use planning, the first group, 
pubic-initiated ones could be mainly put into the category of active intervention (here, 
we say “mainly”, because there could also be some public-initiated zoning 
amendments as a respond to the accumulated application for zoning change proposed 
by the private sector, which should be counted as a “passive control”). Correspondingly, 
the private-initiated ones would be more put into the category of passive control. Also, 
the ratio of public and private initiated zoning amendments could be applied as a 
judgment on whether a zoning system is more centralized or de-centralized. If we see 
relatively more public-initiated zoning amendments and fewer private-initiated zoning 
within a certain city, we could probably say that the city’s zoning system is more 
centralized, vice versa. What’s more, the public initiated ones and private initiated 
ones are even more interacting with rather than independent from each other. A 
public rezoning action might galvanize a following wave of private request for zoning 
amendments. And as mentioned above, we could expect a final public rezoning 
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decision as a response to the accumulated private application for zoning amendments.  
 
Underneath the discordance and cooperation between public and private initiated 
zoning amendments is the conflicts and alignment between public and private interest, 
different private interest, or even different level of governments. The community 
characters depict the contest of social, political and economic power within a 
community. And this kind of power pattern will greatly affect the zoning practice.  
 
Essentially, each zoning amendment could be taken as a re-arrangement of property 
rights, which will break up the existing equilibrium. As this kind of re-arrangement will 
generate a number of transaction cost, for it is time and money consuming to go 
through all the administrative and negotiation process, like ULURP (Uniform Land Use 
Review Procedure) and EIS (Environment Impact Statement) in New York City, the 
applicant could not be motivated enough to bring out the proposal until the 
willingness to pay of this re-arrangement outstrips the transaction cost. There are two 
aspects of notions affecting the willingness to pay here. One is the fiscal capacity, 
which tells how much the applicant is able to pay. The other is the expected return, 
which refers to the expected welfare increase attributed to the zoning amendment. I 
could be an increase in income, for example, a landlord will see an increase in rent 
revenue after an up-zoning paving way for extension of his property. I could also be a 
decrease in loss, for example, residents who propose a down-zoning to put curbs on 
the change of their community characters. Willingness to pay is actually the smaller 
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one in amount of the two. To summarize, the larger fiscal capacity, the higher expected 
return of zoning amendments, the lower transaction cost the application process 
causes the more applications and the higher frequency of zoning amendments there 
will be. 
 
For each specific case, we could be confronted with a three-party game model: the 
applicant (no matter from public or private sector), the arbitrator (the government) 
and the other affected individuals or enterprises. It is reasonable to hypothesize that 
the possibility of bringing out the proposal of zoning amendment will increase if the 
applicant has a stronger bargaining power and a higher expectation of the return. As 
the arbitrator doesn’t stand neutral, for example, it could be affected by lobby, the 
divergence could even be enlarged for the stronger applicant usually has a better lobby 
capability. To summarize, the stronger applicant is able to increase the expected return 
and decrease the transaction cost or have more capability to burden the cost of the 
re-arrangement. At more macro level, the average possibility of bringing out the 
proposal of zoning amendment could be reflected by its frequency. And as mentioned 
above, the contest of power within a community could be traced by its characters, we 
could expect to see a correlation between the zoning amendment frequency and 
community character.         
 
Data and Methodology 
Since this research will focus on what affects the proposal of zoning amendment, the 
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frequency of zoning amendments in this study will be measured by the number of 
application on zoning amendments received by the City Planning Department of New 
York City. The data of zoning amendments are collected from the Land Use & CEQR 
(City Environmental Quality Review) Application Tracking System (LUCATS) in the 
official website of the Department of City Planning, the City of New York. This study 
covers 7,497 zoning amendments applications from July, the year 1976 (when the 
ULURP became effective) to the end of year 2012, containing zoning authorizations, 
zoning certifications, zoning map changes, zoning amendments to zoning resolution 
and zoning special permits. In general, this study will be a quantitative research and 
the major methodology will be the multiple linear regression. As mentioned above, 
the 7,000 plus applications will be sorted into two groups according to their applicants. 
The first group, named as “public”,  
Is proposed by the applicants belonging to the either type of the parties below: 
1. Any executive or legislative branch of the city, state or the country (for examples, 
the New York City Government, the City Council, Department of the City Planning, 
etc.); 
2. Any corporation or non-profit organizations founded, owned by the city and upper 
level government (for examples, the Port Authority, the Housing Authority, the 
Economic Development Corporation, etc.). 
The remaining applications will be regarded as the second group, signed as “private”, 
whose applicants could be private property owners or developers, individuals even 
with a special title like the borough presidents, community board or city council 
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members, grassroots NPOs and branches on lower level than the city, like the 
community board. If there are more than one applicants in a certain application, the 
grouping will be decided by the belonging of the first or principal one.   
 
Figure 2: The Distribution of Private-initiated Applications for Zoning Amendment 
through the Community Districts from Year 1976 to 2012 
 
The community data mainly collected from the Infoshare Online, which mainly bases 
on the four censuses in year 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010. It aggregates the census tract 
data to the community district level. Several indicators are selected to reflect different 
aspects of the community characters, including race structure, income level, property 




Figure 3: The Distribution of Public-initiated Applications for Zoning Amendment 
through the Community Districts from Year 1976 to 2012 
 
As the research covers a long span of time from year 1976 to year 2012, the period of 
time is cut into four decades, each centered by the census year. And the data in the 
census year is used to represent the overall situation of the decade. Last but not least, 
the community districts are assumed to be indifferent other than the factors 
enumerated above, however, in reality, the community districts could vary a lot from 
each other on population and territory and it is reasonable to expect a higher 
frequency of zoning amendments in a community with a larger population or area, 
ceteris paribus. Thus, the area and population are included in the independent 
variables. 
 
Poisson regression is the major method of analysis in this research. Poisson regression 
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model is widely applied in behavioral science. (Gardner, Mulvey & Shaw, 1995) It is an 
instance of the generalized linear model (GLM), which extends regression models to 
the exponential family of distributions. (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989) And Poisson 
regression specifically deals with the dependent variable which is count number and 
assumed to follow Poisson distribution. The Poisson distribution is characterized by 
the expected number of events to occur μ with probability mass functions: 








    
where y! = y (y-1) (y-2) … (2) 1. And the values of Y are restricted to being non-negative 
integers, while μ is not necessary to be an integer. The Poisson distribution is 
characterized with two important properties, which are E[Y] =μ and V[y] =μ. That is to 
say, compared with the normal distribution with a separate parameter for the mean 
and variance, the variance of Poisson distribution equals to the value of its mean. The 
definition and some basic descriptive statistics about the variables are listed in 
Appendix A. Our response (dependent variables), the frequencies of private and public 
applications on zoning amendments are count numbers which is positive skew, 
approximately following a Poisson distribution. Thus, Poisson regression model could 
be a suitable method to do the analysis. 
 
Similar with all the other generalized linear models, the modeling process could be 
divided into three steps: 





The link function here is the natural logarithms log. In another word, it is assumed that 
the logarithm of the dependent variable (response) could be resolved into a linear 
regression function of the independent variables (predictors).  
 
Standard maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) methods are applied to estimate the 
parameters in a Poisson regression model, different from the closed form of solutions 
in multiple regression. As the sample size becomes larger and larger, by ensuring the 
standard error is reduced to the smallest, MLEs are considered to be the “best” 
estimations. It even seems to work well when the sample sizes are not large. Usually, 
likelihood ratio test are used to judge the fitness among the models. The result of 
likelihood ratio test is a p-value, following a chi-square distribution. In order to convert 
the models to the ones with estimates on the ordinary scale, predictions originally 
work-out on the log-scale must be anti-logged. (Schwarz, 2013) 
 
In this research, in order to remove the noise caused by the correlation between the 
independent variables so that the null hypothesis test of independent variables could 
be tenable, Robust Estimation method is adopted. What’s more, the independent 







So that the coefficient of independent variables are more comparable.  
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One of the major possible constraints of Poisson regression model is the existence of 
over-dispersion. As in Poisson regression, the standard deviation of the dependent 
variable is restrictively assumed to be equal to its mean. However, in some cases, the 
standard deviation is substantially larger than the mean, in another words, the 
dependent variable is over-dispersed, which will reduce the fitness of the model 
applying Poisson Regression. As in our case, compared to the public applications, the 
private applications have a considerable risk of over-dispersion for their relatively 
larger deviance. In case of the potential unfitness, Negative Binomial Regression is also 
applied to improve the results of the models.  
 
Similar to Poisson Regression, Negative Binomial Regression also belongs to the family 
of generalized linear model and it also adopts the link function of natural logarithms 
log. The only difference is that, the dependent variable of Negative Binomial 
Regression is assumed to follow Negative Binomial Distribution, instead of Poisson 
distribution. 
 
The analysis consists of three parts. The first part examines the influence of overall 
socio-economic factors within each decade on the frequency of public and private 
applications. The second part focuses on the increment or variation, which could be 
both negative and positive. The independent variables in the second part are the 
absolute-valued percentage of change of the socio-economic factors between the 
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opening and closing year of a period. Census years are chosen to be the endpoints of 
each period and the frequency of private and public applications within each period 
are calculated as the dependent variables. In both part one and part two, negative 
binomial regression models are built for the private applications while Poisson 
regression models are built for the public ones. In part three, linear regression models 
using ordinary least squares method are built to reveal the relationship between the 
frequency of public applications and the nominal annual revenue and real annual 
revenue (adjusted by CPI published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics) of the New 
York City government. Unlike the former parts, whose basic study unit is community 
district, in part three, the data is aggregated to city-level. The dependent variable is 
the frequency of public applications through the whole city in each year from 1980 to 
2012. The independent variables are the statistical disturbance (observed value minus 
expected value) of nominal or real revenue in each year, which is calculated from the 
estimation model based on time trend. The hypothesis is that if the city government 
gets an excess increase of revenue, it will bring out more application in that year.       
 
Results 
1. Part One 
The results of Negative Binomial Regression models on private applications are shown 
in Appendix B while the results of all the Poisson Regression models on public 
applications and their summaries are displayed as tables in Appendix C. Figure 4 using 
period 2006~2012 as an example directly display the relationship between the 
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frequency of private or public applications and the socio-economic factors. The 
relatively low AIC, AICC and BIC values indicate that the models have a high level of fit 
goodness. And the high value of likelihood ratio Chi-square substantiates that the 
models are tenable enough. In the tables of parameter estimates, a positive B value or 
a Exp(B) value above one shows that the independent variable is positively related to 
the dependent variable while a negative B or Exp(B) below one indicates a negative 
effect. 
 
According to the results of Negative Binomial Regression, in period one (year 
1976~1985), the frequency of private initiated applications is significantly affected by 
the area, property value, income level, and housing units ownership, among which, 
the total area and median household income make a positive contribution while a 
larger aggregate value of housing units or a higher owner-occupied rate tend to 
decrease the frequency in a community district. During year 1986~1995, the positive 
effect on private applications by area and median household income stay still. So does 
the negative effect by owner-occupied rate. The influence of population factor, both 
total number and racial make-up, becomes significant in this period, the difference is 
the total population tends to have a negative effect while the non-Hispanic white rate 
has a positive one. For the decade 1996~2005, the influence on the frequency of 
private initiated applications which is caused by factors of area, income level, racial 
structure and housing units ownership stay static while there is no sound influence of 
the other factors. In the last period, from year 2006 to year 2012, the factors of area, 
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median household income and non-Hispanic white repeat their positive effect on the 
private applications associated by the vacancy rate. The owner-occupied rate remains 
to decrease the frequency. Last but not least, the median value of housing units shows 
a negative effect this time.  
 
In terms of the public applications, supported by the results of the Poisson Regression 
Models listed in Appendix C, during the first period (1976~1985), area, median 
household income and vacancy rate are significantly positively correlated to the 
frequency and the aggregate value of housing units tends to have a negative effect of 
the frequency of public applications. When it comes to the second decade 
(1986~1995), the positive effect by area, median household income and the vacancy 
rate is static. What is different from the last decade is the significance of the influence 
of total value of housing units disappears, instead, the owner-occupied rate shows a 
significantly negative influence on the frequency of public applications. Period Three 
and Period Four share similar results: the area and median income show positive effect 
while the owner-occupied rate has a negative one. 
 
To briefly summarize, through the four periods, it could be discovered that for both 
the private and public applications, larger area and higher median income household 
tend to increase the frequency of zoning amendment applications while a higher 
owner-occupied rate is prone to fewer applications. The private sector even has a more 
obvious tendency than the public one. Non-Hispanic white rate could be counted as a 
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positive factor on the frequency of private applications, which is substantiated by the 
model results of three decades out of four. The effect of total population is not so 
convincing but there is some evidence showing that it has a negative effect on the 
frequency of private applications. Vacancy rate is another plausible factor to have a 
positive influence on the frequency of both private and public applications. For the 
private sector, significant results could be found in Period Four, while the effect is 





Figure 4: Distribution of Private and Public Applications from year 2006 to 2012 with 
the Socio-economic Factors  
 
2. Part Two 
Again, the AIC, AICC and BIC values are relatively low and the values of likelihood ratio 
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Chi-square are high, which provides a strong support that the models fit considerably 
well and the results are reliable. Similar with the former part, the results of the 
negative binomial regression models on the private applications are displayed in 
Appendix D and the results of the Poisson regression models on the public applications 
are shown in Appendix E. What’s more, Figure 5 shows the distribution of application 
frequency and change of the factors through all the community districts.  
 
Resting on the negative binomial regression models, between year 1980 and 1989, the 
variation of population and vacancy rate tend to have a positive effect on the 
frequency of private applications while the change of racial structure shows a to 
negatively affect the dependent variable. However, when entering the second period, 
which is from 1990 to 1999, only the variation of non-Hispanic white percentage of 
total population and the owner-occupied rate are significantly correlated with the 
frequency of private application and both of their effect are negative. In the last period, 
the negative effect of the increment of non-Hispanic white rate stays static and the 
change of median value of housing units and median income tend to have a positive 
influence on the dependent variable. 
 
Compared to the apparently disorderly results of the negative binomial regression 
models on the private applications, the results of Poisson regression models on the 
public applications are more regular and clear. The variation of median income shows 
a positive effect through all of the three periods and the change of non-Hispanic white 
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rate tend to have a negative influence on the frequency of public applications on 
zoning amendment. The other factors shows no significant effect in the three periods, 
except that in Period Two (1990~1999), the increment of total population shows a 
positive influence on the dependent variable. 
 
In short, only the variation of non-Hispanic white shows a sound negative influence on 
the frequency of private application and its effect keeps still on public ones. Another 
significant impact factors on public applications is the change of median income, which 




Figure 5: Distribution of Private and Public Applications with the Variation of Socio-
economic Factors between 1980 and 2010 
 
3. Part Three 
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Figure 6 shows the time trend of the growth of nominal and real revenue. Figure 7 
briefly describes how the number public applications varies together with the 
disturbance of nominal and real revenue of the city government. The results of the 
linear regression models are shown in Appendix F. First comes the models of nominal 
revenue and then comes the ones of real revenue. According to the regression models, 
the positive effect on the public applications of both the nominal and real revenue is 
significant. What’s more, the influence of the nominal revenue tend to be stronger, 
supported by a larger adjusted R value of the model (0.311 compared to 0.259 of the 
real revenue). And the influence of the revenues on private applications is not 
significant, which is not shown in the Appendix.    
 
Figure 6: Time Trend of the Nominal and Real Revenue of New York City Government 
































Figure 7: Frequency of Public Applications and the Disturbance of Nominal and Real 
Revenue of New York Government 
 
Interpretation and Conclusion 
A higher income level within a certain community could be a driving factor to increase 
both the expected return and the transaction cost of a zoning amendment. For it is 
likely that developers have the willingness to pay more in a high-income community 
to release more development opportunity because the high expectation of success 
and the residents in high-income community tend to pay more to get a more 
excludable zoning in order to keep their community characters. Correspondingly, a 
fierce change in zoning in a high-income community might incur more violent 
opposition by the residents and property owners because they have a stronger 
bargaining power. However, the results of this research tell that the impact on the 
willingness to pay seems to prevail the impact on the transaction factor. Perhaps it is 


















but the influence is more scatted, thus, the stimulating side becomes more 
outstanding.  
 
The result that Non-Hispanic white rate tends to increase the frequency of private 
applications corresponds to the former studies about the influence on racial structure 
of the communities of zoning and other land use planning. However, as we could not 
distinguish the developers from residents or property owners as applicants, there 
could be two explanations for this result. The first one is that communities with a 
higher non-Hispanic white rate attract more real estate development, which could 
require more zoning amendments. The other one is that the non-Hispanic white group, 
compared with other races, gets more involved in the zoning amendment issues and 
has more political influence to apply zoning tools to express their own interest relevant 
to zoning issues, such like keeping their community characters.  
 
Another noteworthy finding is that larger area increases the frequency of both private 
and public applications while the effect of population is vague or even negative in 
terms of private application. It is natural to believe that larger area calls for more 
zoning amendments within a certain period of time but why is it not obvious that more 
people, or more residents in this situation, ask for more zoning amendments? One 
possible answer is that the number of population counts the residents. However, the 
residents could hardly enjoy the benefits generated by the zoning amendments, like 
the new development, increasing property value etc. while at the same time, they will 
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take most of the burden caused by zoning amendments and following motions, for 
examples, the rising rents, nuisance caused by the new development and so on. 
What’s more, the residents have less incentive to express their interest via bring out 
or blocking a zoning amendment because they could choose to move to another 
community, which has lower cost. Thus, ceteris paribus, a community with a denser 
population will show no tendency to have more frequent zoning amendment. 
 
Similar explanation could also help to understand why the high owner-occupied rate 
tend to decrease the frequency of zoning amendment applications. The interest, or in 
another word “welfare” of property owners is more closely related to the zoning of 
the certain area and they are more rigid. Thus, the applicant will spend more in getting 
the zoning amendment through in a community with larger group of property owners, 
which could keep the application at bay. Therefore, a higher owner occupied rate 
reduce the possibility of a zoning change. 
 
The chaos of the regression results on private applications with the variations might 
reveal the individual’s insensitivity of the change of the community as a whole. The 
first explanation is the high mobility of residents, or even property owners in New York 
City. As our study period is as long as ten years, a great number of dwells could move 
in and out of a certain community. People, as individual, focus more on the existing 
conditions and the foreseeable future other than how it comes to this situation or 
what it will look like after a long period of time. The only exception is the racial make-
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up. The results of the analysis shows that people do care about the change of the racial 
structure. However, it is unexpected that the absolute value of the change rate of non-
Hispanic white is negatively correlated with the frequency of private zoning, which 
means, if, during a period of time, within a community, if the racial structure changes 
a lot, it will see relatively a small number of individual applications on zoning 
amendment. One explanation is that the New York as a whole, during these decades, 
sees a relative increase of minorities so that most of the community districts have a 
larger share of minority population than before. Therefore, a larger variation of non-
Hispanic white could usually, in our case, mean a lower rate of non-Hispanic white of 
population approaching the closing year, which has been approved in the former part 
to have fewer applications. The other explanation is that people could be eager to 
bring about applications to keep their community character only when there is some 
indication that the racial structure will change but the change has not taken place. As 
long as the fierce change breaks out, people will make less effort to stop it.  
 
In contrast, the influence of the variation of these factors on public applications is clear. 
Public applications tend to be a response to the obvious change of the income level of 
a community. However, it is still surprising that the change of non-Hispanic white 
percentage of total population has a negative effect on the frequency of public 
application. The first explanation is similar to the corresponding one in the private part. 
The other explanation is that the trend without zoning amendment is the decrease of 
the proportion of non-Hispanic white population and the more zoning amendment 
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application made, the more get approved and the more distorted the trend will 
become.  
 
To conclude, it will respond to the debate about the flexibility and consistency of 
zoning at the very beginning. One major support of the flexibility is that enough space 
should be kept for discretion in case of change. However, according to the findings of 
this research, it is the reality that the direct driving factor for the people to make 
amendments of a zoning is more of their dissatisfaction of the existing one other than 
the obvious change of the situation. Even though the public sector cares relatively 
more about the change compared with the private applicants, it is restricted by its 
capacity. That’s why we could see there tends to be an additional amount of public-
initiated zoning amendments during the year when there is an extra growth of 
government revenue. Further, the limitation of its rationality could be substantiated 
that the frequency of public applications has a more significant response to the 
nominal revenue other than the real revenue. Therefore, actually, no matter the 
private or the public sector, is not mainly motivated by the change of the social and 
economic settings so that a more restrictive approval process using the change as 
criteria is required. Nevertheless, all of the conjecture rely on the assumption that the 
original zoning fits the former conditions well, which might not be true. Perhaps, it 
could reach a compromise that the public sector should focus more on the change of 
socio-economic factors when considering about the zoning amendments while the 
decision makers should base their judgment about whether the existing zoning fit the 
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situation more on the accumulation of the private applications.      
 
Limitations and Further Study 
Due to the constraint of the basic data and time limit, in this research, the zoning 
amendment applications are not differentiated by their contents, like the “down-
zoning” and “up-zoning” or the category like zoning map change, zoning text change, 
special permits, etc., which could have an influence on the results of the analysis. 
Another limitation is that the property owners and developers are not distinguished in 
the research, whose tendency could be quite different. These limitations are expected 
to be improved in further studies.   
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Appendix A: Variable Definition & Description 
 
Table A.1 Variable Description 
 
Variable Description Unit 
Pri The number of zoning amendment applications initiated 
by applicant from private sector; 
 
Pub The number of zoning amendment applications initiated 
by applicant from public sector; 
 
Pop Total Population of the certain community district Capita 
Area Total Area of the certain community district Acre 




MP The median value of the housing units within the certain 
community, which are occupied by their owners; 
Dollar 
MI The median nominal household income of the certain 
community in the corresponding census year; 
Dollar 
NHW The percentage taking by the Non-Hispanic of the total 
population with the certain community;  
 
VR The percentage taking by the vacant units of the total 
number of housing units within the certain community; 
 
OOR The percentage taking by the units occupied by their 
owners of the total number of occupied housing units; 
 
ΔPop The variation of population between the opening and 
closing year in a period; 
 
ΔMP The variation of median value of housing units between 
the opening and closing year in a period; 
 
ΔMI The variation of median nominal household income 
between the opening and closing year in a period; 
 
ΔNHW The variation of the percentage taking by the Non-
Hispanic of the total population with the certain 
community between the opening and closing year in a 
period; 
 
ΔVR The variation of vacancy rate between the opening and 
closing year in a period; 
 
ΔOOR The variation of owner occupancy rate between the 
opening and closing year in a period; 
 
DNRev The statistical disturbance of nominal annual revenue of 
the city government; 
 






Table A.2 Mean & Standard Deviation of the Variables 
 
Variables 1976~1985 1986~1995 1996~2005 2006~2012 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Pri 26  51  26  51  26  42  20  33  
Pub 7  9  7  9  5  6  5  5  
Pop 119643  41005  123669  41654  135394  45575  138538  43449  
Area 2958  2750  2958  2750  2958  2750  2958  2750  
AVHs 1112045  1534514  - - - - - - 
MP - - 183822  77223  468146  186782  529616  164230  
MI 14007  4922  29766  11295  39618  16286  53603  23108  
NHW 50.5% 0.322  42.5% 0.303  34.5% 0.272  33.0% 0.256  
VR 5.8% 0.037  5.7% 0.031  5.8% 0.028  7.6% 0.027  
OOR 23.1% 0.186  27.4% 0.184  28.6% 0.177  29.5% 0.174  
 
 
Table A.3 the Frequency of Zoning Amendments by Community 
 
Community District 1976~1985 1986~1995 1996~2005 2006~2012 
private public private public private public private public 
X01 3 6 4 7 3 6 1 9 
X02 4 4 4 1 5 1 2 2 
X03 1 8 2 0 2 3 5 5 
X04 5 3 4 5 3 16 2 1 
X05 5 3 4 1 1 3 0 0 
X06 1 10 4 1 6 0 1 5 
X07 11 0 17 1 4 0 3 0 
X08 82 7 58 1 39 5 51 1 
X09 4 2 10 0 16 1 4 5 
X10 10 10 8 4 36 11 14 7 
X11 5 0 9 0 8 2 6 1 
X12 9 1 4 5 5 2 6 2 
Bronx 140 54 128 26 128 50 95 38 
M01 128 45 75 29 130 14 86 14 
M02 131 23 67 14 93 7 68 4 
M03 9 9 3 7 16 6 7 22 
M04 57 20 69 16 94 22 105 25 
M05 174 23 122 20 158 3 109 0 
M06 86 6 42 9 41 7 41 1 
M07 60 24 56 15 42 2 48 4 
M08 76 34 69 11 45 5 30 4 
M09 4 2 5 0 5 0 8 2 
M10 3 6 4 6 3 6 6 3 
M11 5 5 6 16 15 12 3 7 
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M12 7 6 10 1 7 3 6 0 
Manhattan 740 203 528 144 649 87 517 86 
Q01 6 6 13 4 25 2 10 9 
Q02 18 3 30 9 22 3 12 10 
Q03 13 3 12 4 7 1 1 1 
Q04 10 1 9 2 14 0 2 0 
Q05 4 3 8 4 8 2 0 2 
Q06 10 0 7 3 6 2 5 4 
Q07 33 8 36 6 29 12 55 6 
Q08 4 4 10 4 13 6 12 2 
Q09 6 5 16 0 3 1 0 1 
Q10 7 3 9 0 10 1 7 4 
Q11 4 2 4 2 7 2 3 1 
Q12 11 2 9 6 10 4 4 11 
Q13 5 1 3 4 6 4 4 3 
Q14 1 2 7 8 32 10 13 5 
Queens 132 43 173 56 192 50 128 59 
K01 5 9 8 6 19 16 42 8 
K02 18 29 9 39 25 25 12 16 
K03 1 5 1 2 4 3 4 4 
K04 0 2 2 2 2 3 3 0 
K05 16 0 12 4 9 1 6 5 
K06 9 9 9 6 12 6 11 4 
K07 9 4 8 9 6 3 0 3 
K08 4 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 
K09 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
K10 2 7 1 0 11 3 5 1 
K11 1 0 2 0 2 1 8 0 
K12 9 2 10 5 17 2 8 16 
K13 9 2 20 6 14 3 18 8 
K14 4 1 4 4 5 1 4 2 
K15 8 4 7 1 23 6 9 0 
K16 0 10 3 6 4 1 2 1 
K17 3 0 2 2 1 1 1 0 
K18 15 0 6 6 15 0 6 4 
Brooklyn 113 85 106 100 170 77 141 73 
R01 29 11 85 7 106 23 106 13 
R02 294 8 352 6 221 11 151 4 
R03 82 32 57 15 75 8 51 4 
Staten Island 





















Appendix B: Negative Binomial Regression Models on Private Applications with 
Independent Variables Measuring the Overall 
 
Table B.1 Negative Binomial Regression of Private Applications in Year 1976~1985 
 
Goodness of Fita 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 37.895 54 .702 
Scaled Deviance 37.895 54  
Pearson Chi-Square 33.544 54 .621 
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 33.544 54  
Log Likelihoodb -206.361   
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 422.722   
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC) 423.854   
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 433.110   
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 438.110   
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), Area, AHV, MI, OORa 
a. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 







91.671 4 .000 
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), Area, AHV, MI, OORa 









Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald 
Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 2.431 .1027 2.230 2.633 559.982 1 .000 11.372 9.298 13.909 
Area 1.112 .1312 .855 1.369 71.790 1 .000 3.040 2.350 3.931 
AHV -1.006 .2365 -1.470 -.543 18.112 1 .000 .366 .230 .581 
MI 1.703 .2096 1.292 2.114 66.021 1 .000 5.492 3.642 8.283 
OOR -1.042 .2295 -1.492 -.592 20.613 1 .000 .353 .225 .553 
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(Scale) 1a          
(Negative 
binomial) 
1a          
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), Area, AHV, MI, OOR 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
 
 
Table B.2 Negative Binomial Regression of Private Applications in Year 1986~1995 
 
Goodness of Fita 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 28.975 53 .547 
Scaled Deviance 28.975 53  
Pearson Chi-Square 24.241 53 .457 
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 24.241 53  
Log Likelihoodb -209.427   
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 430.855   
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC) 432.470   
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 443.320   
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 449.320   
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), Pop, Area, MI, NHW, OORa 
a. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 







77.637 5 .000 
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), Pop, Area, MI, NHW, OORa 














Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 2.491 .0882 2.318 2.664 797.229 1 .000 12.077 10.159 14.356 
Pop -.178 .0796 -.334 -.022 4.983 1 .026 .837 .716 .979 
Area .934 .1643 .611 1.256 32.270 1 .000 2.544 1.843 3.510 
MI 1.107 .1963 .723 1.492 31.835 1 .000 3.026 2.060 4.446 
NHW .392 .1752 .049 .736 5.019 1 .025 1.481 1.050 2.087 
OOR -1.288 .2269 -1.733 -.844 32.228 1 .000 .276 .177 .430 
(Scale) 1a          
(Negative 
binomial) 
1a          
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), Pop, Area, MI, NHW, OOR 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
 
 
Table B.3 Negative Binomial Regression of Private Applications in Year 1996~2005 
 
Goodness of Fita 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 28.689 54 .531 
Scaled Deviance 28.689 54  
Pearson Chi-Square 24.384 54 .452 
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 24.384 54  
Log Likelihoodb -218.740   
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 447.481   
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC) 448.613   
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 457.868   
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 462.868   
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), Area, MI, NWH, OORa 
a. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 







67.742 4 .000 
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), Area, MI, NWH, OORa 
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Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald 
Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 2.659 .0877 2.487 2.831 918.587 1 .000 14.282 12.026 16.962 
Area .752 .1610 .436 1.068 21.815 1 .000 2.121 1.547 2.909 
MI .729 .1257 .482 .975 33.581 1 .000 2.072 1.620 2.651 
NWH .535 .1270 .286 .784 17.717 1 .000 1.707 1.331 2.190 
OOR -.794 .1814 -1.149 -.438 19.152 1 .000 .452 .317 .645 
(Scale) 1a          
(Negative 
binomial) 
1a          
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), Area, MI, NWH, OOR 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
 
 
Table B.4 Negative Binomial Regression of Private Applications in Year 1996~2005 
 
Goodness of Fita 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 39.279 52 .755 
Scaled Deviance 39.279 52  
Pearson Chi-Square 34.493 52 .663 
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 34.493 52  
Log Likelihoodb -197.103   
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 408.206   
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC) 410.402   
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 422.749   
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 429.749   
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), Area, MI, MP, NHW, VR, OORa 
a. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 









81.068 6 .000 
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), Area, MI, MP, NHW, VR, 
OORa 








Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald 
Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 2.264 .1054 2.057 2.471 461.225 1 .000 9.623 7.826 11.831 
Area .827 .2510 .335 1.319 10.850 1 .001 2.286 1.398 3.738 
MI .761 .2088 .352 1.170 13.281 1 .000 2.140 1.422 3.223 
MP -.464 .2134 -.882 -.045 4.718 1 .030 .629 .414 .956 
NHW .841 .1732 .502 1.181 23.605 1 .000 2.320 1.652 3.257 
VR .318 .1293 .064 .571 6.027 1 .014 1.374 1.066 1.770 
OOR -.791 .2537 -1.289 -.294 9.732 1 .002 .453 .276 .745 
(Scale) 1a          
(Negative 
binomial) 
1a          
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), Area, MI, MP, NHW, VR, OOR 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
 
Table B.5 Summary of the Negative Binomial Regression Models 
 
 Pop Area MP(AVH)a MI NHW VR OOR 
1976~1985  +b - +   - 
1986~1995 - +  + +  - 
1996~2005  +  + +  - 
2006~2012  + - + + + - 
a. AVH of period year 1976~1985 and MP of all the other periods. 





Appendix C: Poisson Regression Models on Public Applications with Independent 
Variables Measuring the Overall 
 
Table C.1 Poisson Regression of Public Applications in Year 1976~1985  
 
Goodness of Fita 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 342.060 54 6.334 
Scaled Deviance 342.060 54  
Pearson Chi-Square 352.183 54 6.522 
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 352.183 54  
Log Likelihoodb -261.194   
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 532.389   
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC) 533.521   
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 542.776   
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 547.776   
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), Area, AHV, MI, VRa 
a. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 







199.931 4 .000 
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), Area, AHV, MI, VRa 








Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1.806 .1249 1.562 2.051 209.044 1 .000 6.089 4.766 7.778 
Area .468 .2039 .068 .868 5.269 1 .022 1.597 1.071 2.381 
AHV -.942 .2559 -1.443 -.440 13.546 1 .000 .390 .236 .644 
MI .761 .1151 .536 .987 43.743 1 .000 2.141 1.709 2.683 
VR .348 .1191 .114 .581 8.522 1 .004 1.416 1.121 1.788 
(Scale) 1a          
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Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), Area, AHV, MI, VR 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
 
 
Table C.2 Poisson Regression of Public Applications in Year 1986~1995  
 
Goodness of Fita 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 251.760 54 4.662 
Scaled Deviance 251.760 54  
Pearson Chi-Square 313.332 54 5.802 
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 313.332 54  
Log Likelihoodb -212.740   
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 435.480   
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC) 436.612   
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 445.868   
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 450.868   
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), Area, MI, VR, OORa 
a. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 







131.761 4 .000 
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), Area, MI, VR, OORa 








Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1.641 .1380 1.370 1.911 141.279 1 .000 5.159 3.936 6.762 
Area .362 .1721 .025 .700 4.433 1 .035 1.437 1.025 2.013 
MI .505 .1593 .193 .817 10.057 1 .002 1.657 1.213 2.264 
VR .240 .0660 .110 .369 13.193 1 .000 1.271 1.117 1.446 
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OOR -.631 .2671 -1.154 -.107 5.580 1 .018 .532 .315 .898 
(Scale) 1a          
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), Area, MI, VR, OOR 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
 
 
Table C.3 Poisson Regression of Public Applications in Year 1996~2005 
 
Goodness of Fita 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 253.443 55 4.608 
Scaled Deviance 253.443 55  
Pearson Chi-Square 306.408 55 5.571 
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 306.408 55  
Log Likelihoodb -211.959   
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 431.918   
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC) 432.659   
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 440.228   
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 444.228   
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), MI, OOR, Areaa 
a. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 







64.535 3 .000 
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), MI, OOR, Areaa 








Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1.550 .1380 1.279 1.820 126.059 1 .000 4.711 3.594 6.174 
MI .457 .1000 .261 .653 20.885 1 .000 1.579 1.298 1.921 
48 
 
OOR -.793 .2505 -1.284 -.302 10.028 1 .002 .452 .277 .739 
Area .640 .1782 .290 .989 12.887 1 .000 1.896 1.337 2.689 
(Scale) 1a          
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), MI, OOR, Area 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
 
 
Table C.4 Poisson Regression of Public Applications in Year 2006~2012 
 
Goodness of Fita 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 281.832 55 5.124 
Scaled Deviance 281.832 55  
Pearson Chi-Square 320.782 55 5.832 
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 320.782 55  
Log Likelihoodb -220.180   
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 448.360   
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC) 449.101   
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 456.671   
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 460.671   
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), Area, OOR, MIa 
a. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 







24.616 3 .000 
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), Area, OOR, MIa 








Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1.504 .1434 1.223 1.785 109.924 1 .000 4.498 3.396 5.958 
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Area .375 .1695 .043 .708 4.902 1 .027 1.455 1.044 2.029 
OOR -.522 .2260 -.965 -.079 5.341 1 .021 .593 .381 .924 
MI .325 .1329 .065 .585 5.986 1 .014 1.384 1.067 1.796 
(Scale) 1a          
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), Area, OOR, MI 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
 
 
Table C.5 Summary of the Poisson Regression Models on Public Applications with 
Independent Variables Measuring the Overall  
 
 Pop Area MP(AVH)a MI NHW VR OOR 
1976~1985  +b - +  +  
1986~1995  +  +  + - 
1996~2005  +  +   - 
2006~2012  +  +   - 
a. AVH of period year 1976~1985 and MP of all the other periods. 






Appendix D: Negative Binomial Regression Models on Private Applications with 
Independent Variables Measuring the Incremental 
 
Table D.1 Negative Binomial Regression of Private Applications in Year 1980~1989 
 
Goodness of Fita 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 74.157 55 1.348 
Scaled Deviance 74.157 55  
Pearson Chi-Square 108.399 55 1.971 
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 108.399 55  
Log Likelihoodb -236.621   
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 481.242   
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC) 481.983   
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 489.552   
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 493.552   
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), ΔPop, ΔNHW, ΔVRa 
a. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 







62.645 3 .000 
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), ΔPop, ΔNHW, ΔVRa 








Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald 
Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 2.503 .3221 1.872 3.135 60.414 1 .000 12.224 6.502 22.981 
ΔPop .031 .0102 .011 .051 9.088 1 .003 1.031 1.011 1.052 
ΔNHW -.032 .0079 -.047 -.016 15.916 1 .000 .969 .954 .984 
ΔVR .020 .0036 .013 .027 33.007 1 .000 1.021 1.014 1.028 





1a          
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), ΔPop, ΔNHW, ΔVR 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
 
 
Table D.2 Negative Binomial Regression of Private Applications in Year 1990~1999 
 
Goodness of Fita 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 57.845 56 1.033 
Scaled Deviance 57.845 56  
Pearson Chi-Square 57.100 56 1.020 
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 57.100 56  
Log Likelihoodb -214.770   
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 435.540   
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC) 435.976   
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 441.772   
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 444.772   
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), ΔNHW, ΔOORa 
a. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 







38.648 2 .000 
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), ΔNHW, ΔOORa 








Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald 
Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
52 
 
(Intercept) 4.004 .2466 3.521 4.488 263.746 1 .000 54.843 33.825 88.921 
ΔNHW -.042 .0076 -.057 -.027 29.694 1 .000 .959 .945 .974 
ΔOOR -.027 .0078 -.042 -.011 11.805 1 .001 .974 .959 .989 
(Scale) 1a          
(Negative 
binomial) 
1a          
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), ΔNHW, ΔOOR 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
 
 
Table D.3 Negative Binomial Regression of Private Applications in Year 2000~2009 
 
Goodness of Fita 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 78.201 55 1.422 
Scaled Deviance 78.201 55  
Pearson Chi-Square 109.647 55 1.994 
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 109.647 55  
Log Likelihoodb -253.617   
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 515.233   
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC) 515.974   
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 523.544   
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 527.544   
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), ΔMP, ΔMI, ΔNHWa 
a. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 







24.945 3 .000 
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), ΔMP, ΔMI, ΔNHWa 










Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald 
Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 2.047 .4047 1.254 2.840 25.587 1 .000 7.745 3.504 17.119 
ΔMP .062 .0191 .025 .100 10.542 1 .001 1.064 1.025 1.105 
ΔMI .079 .0294 .022 .137 7.292 1 .007 1.083 1.022 1.147 
ΔNHW -.005 .0013 -.008 -.003 15.992 1 .000 .995 .992 .997 
(Scale) 1a          
(Negative 
binomial) 
1a          
Dependent Variable: Pri 
Model: (Intercept), ΔMP, ΔMI, ΔNHW 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
 
Table D.4 Summary of the Negative Binomial Regression Models on Private 
Applications with Independent Variables Measuring the Incremental  
 
 ΔPop ΔMP ΔMI ΔNHW ΔVR ΔOOR 
1980~1989 + /a  - +  
1990~1999    -  - 
2000~2009  + + -   




Appendix E: Poisson Regression Models on Public Applications with Independent 
Variables Measuring the Incremental 
 
Table E.1 Poisson Regression of Public Applications in Year 1980~1989 
 
Goodness of Fita 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 256.503 56 4.580 
Scaled Deviance 256.503 56  
Pearson Chi-Square 247.508 56 4.420 
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 247.508 56  
Log Likelihoodb -230.604   
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 467.208   
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC) 467.645   
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 473.441   
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 476.441   
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), ΔMI, ΔNHWa 
a. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 







329.330 2 .000 
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), ΔMI, ΔNHWa 








Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1.773 .2626 1.258 2.287 45.579 1 .000 5.886 3.518 9.847 
ΔMI .030 .0042 .021 .038 49.904 1 .000 1.030 1.022 1.038 
ΔNHW -.025 .0066 -.038 -.012 14.273 1 .000 .976 .963 .988 
(Scale) 1a          
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), ΔMI, ΔNHW 
55 
 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
 
 
Table E.2 Poisson Regression of Public Applications in Year 1990~1999 
 
Goodness of Fita 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 185.779 55 3.378 
Scaled Deviance 185.779 55  
Pearson Chi-Square 191.288 55 3.478 
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 191.288 55  
Log Likelihoodb -168.745   
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 345.490   
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC) 346.231   
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 353.800   
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 357.800   
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), ΔPop, ΔMI, ΔNHWa 
a. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 







94.142 3 .000 
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), ΔPop, ΔMI, ΔNHWa 








Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1.504 .1573 1.196 1.813 91.406 1 .000 4.501 3.307 6.127 
ΔPop .026 .0067 .013 .039 14.939 1 .000 1.026 1.013 1.040 
ΔMI .030 .0088 .013 .047 11.406 1 .001 1.030 1.013 1.048 
ΔNHW -.031 .0046 -.039 -.022 44.687 1 .000 .970 .961 .979 
(Scale) 1a          
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Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), ΔPop, ΔMI, ΔNHW 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
 
 
Table E.3 Poisson Regression of Public Applications in Year 2000~2009 
 
Goodness of Fita 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 274.320 56 4.899 
Scaled Deviance 274.320 56  
Pearson Chi-Square 287.269 56 5.130 
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 287.269 56  
Log Likelihoodb -231.084   
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 468.167   
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC) 468.604   
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 474.400   
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 477.400   
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), ΔMI, ΔNHWa 
a. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 







58.682 2 .000 
Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), ΔMI, ΔNHWa 








Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1.562 .0794 1.407 1.718 386.952 1 .000 4.770 4.083 5.574 
ΔMI .065 .0085 .048 .081 57.685 1 .000 1.067 1.049 1.085 
ΔNHW -.004 .0009 -.005 -.002 18.649 1 .000 .996 .995 .998 
(Scale) 1a          
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Dependent Variable: Pub 
Model: (Intercept), ΔMI, ΔNHW 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
 
 
Table E.4 Summary of the Poisson Regression Models on Public Applications with 
Independent Variables Measuring the Incremental  
 
 ΔPop ΔMP ΔMI ΔNHW ΔVR ΔOOR 
1980~1989  /a + -   
1990~1999 +  + -   
2000~2009   + -   




Appendix F: Linear Regression Models on Public Applications from 1980 to 2012 
 
Table F.1 Linear Regression Models on Public Applications with the Disturbance of 
Nominal Annual Revenue as Independent Variable 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
 .576a .332 .311 16.063 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DNRev 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
 
Regression 3980.954 1 3980.954 15.429 .000b 
Residual 7998.379 31 258.012   
Total 11979.333 32    
a. Dependent Variable: Pub 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DNRev 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) 48.667 2.796  17.405 .000 
DNRev .004 .001 .576 3.928 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Pub 
 
 
Table F.2 Linear Regression Models on Public Applications with the Disturbance of 
Real Annual Revenue as Independent Variable 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
 .531a .282 .259 16.657 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DRRev 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
 
Regression 3378.120 1 3378.120 12.175 .001b 
Residual 8601.213 31 277.458   
Total 11979.333 32    
a. Dependent Variable: Pub 
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b. Predictors: (Constant), DRRev 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) 48.667 2.900  16.784 .000 
DRRev .012 .004 .531 3.489 .001 
a. Dependent Variable: Pub 
 
 
